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The Texas economy generally continued to outperform most of the country 
during the Survey period, allowing the Texas legislature the luxury of avoiding the 
need to raise substantial, new taxes. Local jurisdictions, however, continued to 
push property values in order to support the ad valorem tax base, and the 
comptroller’s office adopted some overly aggressive interpretations of law in 
taxpayer disputes. As always, judicial decisions often offered the final answers to 
taxpayers and taxing jurisdictions—at least pending action in the 2015 legislative 
session.1 
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 1. Because Susan Combs was Comptroller during the Survey period, this article generally refers 
to Comptroller Combs rather than to her successor, Comptroller Hegar. 
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I.  SALES TAX 
A.  REPORTED CASES2 
During the Survey period, the comptroller’s office continued its recent efforts 
to chip away at a number of established sales and use tax exemptions, including 
by focusing on exemptions traditionally available to certain industries and for 
certain transactional structures. Taxpayers prevailed in some important cases but 
saw mixed results and losses in other cases, and several decisions are headed for 
appeal. Significantly, some of the comptroller’s most recent victories have limited 
applicability and should not adversely affect cases in which the fact patterns differ 
materially from the fact patterns at issue in the reported cases. Although the same 
is, of course, true of taxpayer victories as well, the Texas Supreme Court made 
clear that taxpayers are entitled to statutory exemptions despite whether the 
comptroller agrees with the underlying legislative policy. 
In Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., Roark Amusement sought a 
refund of sales taxes paid on plush toys used as prizes in coin-operated crane 
machines.3 Under section 151.006(a)(3) of the Texas Tax Code, tangible personal 
property acquired for the purpose of transferring it as an integral part of a taxable 
service qualifies for the sale-for-resale exemption.4 Section 151.0101(a) defines 
“taxable service” to include “amusement services,”5 and section 151.335(a) 
exempts from taxation “amusement services provided through coin-operated 
machines.”6 The comptroller argued that the amusement service provided by the 
coin-operated machines was not a taxable service under section 151.006 because 
of the exemption provided by section 151.335(a).7 The court dismissed this 
argument, correctly acknowledging the essential difference between exclusions 
from tax, pursuant to which items or entities are never subject to tax in the first 
place, and exemptions from tax, pursuant to which items that might otherwise be 
taxable by their nature are exempted by a specific provision. “Indeed, there would 
be no need to provide an exemption for this particular service if it were not a 
taxable service in the first instance.”8 
The comptroller argued as well that for the sale-for-resale exemption to apply, 
the mere chance to win a toy does not suffice; rather, the comptroller argued, a 
toy must be transferred to the purchaser with each transaction.9 Section 
151.302(b) provides that tangible personal property is not considered resold 
unless the care, custody, or control of the property is “transferred to the purchaser 
 
 2. Two important cases decided during this article’s Survey period, Verizon Business Network 
Serv., Inc. v. Combs, No. 07-11-00025-CV, 2013 WL 1343530 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. 
dismissed) (mem. op.), and Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2013), are 
discussed in the previous issue of the Taxation edition of the SMU Law Review. See Cynthia M. 
Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 66 SMU L. REV. 1181 (2013). 
 3. Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422 S.W.3d 632, 633 (Tex. 2013). 
 4. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006(a)(3) (West 2013). 
 5. Id. § 151.0101(a). 
 6. Id. § 151.335(a). 
 7. Roark Amusement & Vending, 422 S.W.3d at 636. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 637. 
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of the service.”10 The court reasoned that the comptroller’s interpretation of this 
section placed too much emphasis on the word “‘the’ . . . the commonest article 
of speech.”11 Rather, taking into account the economic realities of operating a 
game of chance and finding that all of the toys in the coin-operated machines 
eventually went to a purchaser, the court concluded that the taxpayer had satisfied 
the requirements to qualify for the sale-for-resale exemption.12 Significantly, the 
court made clear that statutory exemptions must be honored: “The Comptroller 
cannot through rulemaking impose taxes that are not due under the Tax Code; 
the question of statutory construction presented in this case ultimately is one left 
to the courts.”13 
In DTWC Corporation v. Combs, another case examining the reach of the sale-
for-resale exemption, DTWC brought a claim for refund of sales taxes paid for 
hotel consumables, which included sundry complimentary items that hotels 
provide to their guests with their rooms, such as soap, shampoo, pens, and 
notepads.14 Reversing the district court, the Austin Court of Appeals held that 
the sale-for-resale exemption applies to these items.15 The comptroller argued that 
because the sale of the use of a room―and therefore the hotel consumables 
included with the room―is subject to the hotel tax and not the sales tax, the 
hotel’s purchases of the hotel consumables do not qualify for the sale-for-resale 
exemption.16 The court correctly dismissed this argument, finding that there is no 
requirement that the resale transaction be subject to the sales tax in order for the 
 
 10. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302(b) (West 2013) (emphasis added). Another case filed 
during the Survey period and still pending at the time this article went to press may address the “care, 
custody, or control” element in the software context. See Softlayer Tech., Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-
13-000673 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. filed Feb. 22, 2013). In addressing whether the 
purchase of software installed on its own servers qualifies for the sale-for-resale exemption, Softlayer 
argues that because the “care, custody, and control” of the software were transferred to its customers 
upon the purchase of services, the software was transferred and therefore exempt as a sale for resale. 
The comptroller’s challenge to the resale exemption in this context contradicts the comptroller’s 
former, long-standing recognition that software loaded on a buyer’s servers may qualify for the 
exemption. See, e.g., Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts STAR Sys. No. 9703063L (Mar. 17, 1997, 
superseded on Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://cpastar2.cpa.state.tx.us/index.html (last visited Feb. 
11, 2015) (finding that software that is available on a taxpayer’s mainframe for use by the taxpayer’s 
clients qualified for the resale exemption). Comptroller policy interpretations that appear to erode 
years of authority and industry practice will continue to trigger taxpayer disputes regarding not only 
software but also other items and issues.  
 11. Roark Amusement & Vending, 422 S.W.3d at 637. 
 12. Id. (explaining that “in the area of tax law, like other areas of economic regulation, a plain-
meaning determination should not disregard the economic realities underlying the transaction in 
issue”). Note, however, that this statement does not constitute an adoption of a formal substance-
over-form rule, which would require either a legislative amendment or adoption of a specific 
administrative rule. 
 13. Id. at 638. In other recent tax cases, the Texas Supreme Court has affirmed the courts’ role 
in applying the plain meaning of statutory language in the face of an incompatible agency position. 
See Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tex. 2013) (stating that “a 
precondition to agency deference is ambiguity; ‘an agency’s opinion cannot change plain language.’ 
There is no ambiguity about this ambiguity requirement.”); Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Comm’n on 
State Emergency Commc’ns, 397 S.W.3d 173, 182–83 (Tex. 2013) (stating that “agency deference 
does not displace strict construction when the dispute is not over how much tax is due but, more 
fundamentally, whether the tax applies at all”). 
 14. DTWC Corp. v. Combs, 400 S.W.3d 149, 150 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no. pet.). 
 15. Id. at 156. 
 16. Id. at 153. 
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initial sale transaction to qualify for the sale-for-resale exemption.17 The court also 
dismissed the comptroller’s argument that no consideration was given for the use 
of the consumables as required by the definitions of “sale” and “purchase” under 
section 151.005(1), finding that the fee for the room included the use of the room 
and its amenities, including the hotel consumables.18 
The comptroller also argued that DTWC did not qualify for the exemption 
because it was not in the business of selling hotel consumables.19 The court 
correctly noted that the sale-for-resale exemption does not require that the 
business seeking the exemption be in the business of selling the particular items at 
issue; instead, the exemption requires only that the items are bought and resold 
“in the normal course of business.”20 Finally, the court dismissed the 
comptroller’s argument that the hotel consumables were subject to use tax under 
section 151.154(a), which requires tax to be paid for “any use of the taxable item 
other than retention, demonstration, or display while holding it for sale,” because 
the court found that, although the items did bear the hotel’s name and logo and 
thereby served some marketing function, the items were stored in a locked room 
until made available for use by the hotel guests.21 
Coming on the heels of a handful of years in which the comptroller has closely 
scrutinized convenience store and gas station taxpayers, FM Express Food Market, 
Inc. v. Combs involves a convenience store’s challenge to the comptroller’s ability 
to estimate the amount of taxes at issue in an audit when she is not satisfied with 
the documentary evidence supplied by the taxpayer.22 The comptroller audited 
FM Express for sales tax compliance. Because FM Express had failed to keep 
adequate records of its sales, the auditor estimated FM Express’s sales tax liability 
from records kept by FM Express’s suppliers.23 FM Express argued that section 
111.0042 of the Tax Code and Rule 3.282(c) permitted only two methods to 
determine a taxpayer’s tax liability—a detailed auditing procedure and a sample 
and projection auditing method—and that the auditor’s use of the estimated 
auditing method is therefore prohibited.24 Relying on precedent as well as on its 
reading of section 111.008(a), which permits the comptroller, in certain 
circumstances, to “compute and determine the amount of tax to be paid from the 
information contained in the report or from any other information available to 
the comptroller,” the Austin Court of Appeals upheld the comptroller’s use of an 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 153–55; Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 151.005(1) (West 2013) (stating that “‘[s]ale’ or 
‘purchase’ means any of the following when done or performed for consideration: (1) a transfer of 
title or possession of tangible personal property . . .”). The comptroller’s argument that no 
consideration was paid for the items reflects a continuing effort to apply a too-narrow construction 
to the term “consideration.” 
 19. DTWC, 400 S.W.3d at 155. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 156. 
 22. FM Express Food Market, Inc. v. Combs, No. 03-12-00144-CV, 2013 WL 1188055, at *1 
(Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at *3; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.0042 (West 2013) (providing guidelines for when the 
sample auditing method is appropriate); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.282(c) (2013) (Tex. Comptroller 
Pub. Accounts, Auditing Taxpayer Records) (permitting detailed and sample and projection auditing 
methods). 
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estimated auditing procedure.25 The comptroller is authorized to take certain 
measures to ensure that she is able effectively and efficiently to accomplish her tax 
administration duties. However, perhaps because many comptroller 
representatives, including at the audit level, have heavy workloads, there appears 
to be an increasing number of cases in which auditors reject evidence and 
documentary support that was maintained in the ordinary course of taxpayers’ 
business, demanding instead nonexistent records that taxpayers are not required 
to maintain. 
Convenience stores and gas stations were not the only targets of aggressive audit 
focus during the Survey period. It seems nearly impossible these days to say 
“aircraft” without triggering audit attention. It is certainly true that some 
taxpayers’ transactions differ from those that, pursuant to the comptroller’s 
previous and long-established interpretations, are nontaxable. However, it is 
equally true that the comptroller’s office has simply changed its 
interpretation―apparently to increase revenue―without regard for the fact that 
there has been no change in statutory law or judicial interpretation to transform 
aircraft transfers made via nontaxable methods (e.g., capital contributions) into 
taxable transactions. Of the disproportionate number of audits devoted to aircraft 
sales, several involved disputed exemptions. In Energy Education of Montana, Inc. v. 
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, for example, the Austin Court of Appeals 
addressed the interplay of the sales tax and use tax as applied to the out-of-state 
purchase of an aircraft that was later used in Texas.26 EEM purchased an aircraft 
in Montana and then flew the aircraft to California for several days before 
hangaring the aircraft for three years in Texas.27 In its claim for refund, EEM 
argued that the aircraft was exempt from taxation under former section 
151.328(a)(4) of the Tax Code, which exempted an aircraft “sold to a person for 
use and registration in another state or nation before any use in this state other 
than flight training . . . and the transportation of the aircraft out of this state.”28 
EEM asserted that its facts met the plain meaning of the statutory language in 
former section 151.328(a)(4), thereby exempting the airplane from both sales and 
 
 25. FM Express Food Market, 2013 WL 1188055, at *3; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.008(a) (West 
2013); see Alon USA, LP v. Texas, 222 S.W.3d 19, 34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (stating 
that when “the tax cannot be determined with reasonable mathematical certainty from the available 
records, and the taxing authority declares the tax due from all information available that it deems 
reasonable, the burden to show that the determination was unreasonable, excessive, or that it was 
reached capriciously or arbitrarily, shifts to the complainant”). 
 26. Energy Educ. of Mont., Inc. v. Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, No. 03-10-00644-CV, 
2013 WL 1831453, at *1 (Tex. App.―Austin Apr. 25, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Also, in two 
district court cases involving aircraft, the plaintiffs argued that the sale-for-resale exemption applies 
to an aircraft purchased for the purpose of leasing it. See Caledon Aviation, LLC v. Combs, No. D-1-
GN-12-001550 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 17, 2014) (concluding that the sale for 
resale exemption did not apply to Caledon); Johnson v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-13-002485 (126th Dist. 
Ct., Travis County, Tex. filed July 21, 2013). The Johnson case was still pending at the time this article 
went to press. 
 27. Energy Educ. of Mont., 2013 WL 1831453, at *1. 
 28. Id. at *2; Act of May 9, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 147, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 994, 995 
(amended 2007) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(4) (West 2013)). The current 
version of section 151.328(a)(4) expressly states that for the exemption to apply the sale must occur 
in Texas. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.328(a)(4) (West 2013). The court also dismissed EEM’s 
argument that EEM’s use of the aircraft in Texas was exempted by Rule 3.927(c)(9), which provides 
that “Texas sales or use tax” is not due on an aircraft meeting the section 151.328(a)(4) requirements. 
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use tax, because the airplane was sold (albeit outside of Texas) and was registered 
and used outside of Texas for several days before it was flown to Texas. The court 
stated, somewhat confusingly, that while this section provides an exemption from 
sales tax, it was not meant to exempt aircrafts used in Texas from the use tax: 
This provision does not create an exemption to the use tax because the use 
tax and the exemption are mutually exclusive: An aircraft that is used in 
Texas, subjecting it to the use tax, could not have been sold for use in 
another state; likewise, an aircraft that was sold for use in and used in 
another state would not be subject to the use tax so no exemption from the 
use tax is needed.29 
The comptroller’s and court’s focus on the distinction between use tax and 
sales tax exemptions in this context appears to mark another shift in comptroller 
analysis and a retreat from prior, published rulings. This case is undoubtedly just 
one more in what is likely to be a long line of cases exploring―and 
exhausting―the bounds of existing authority regarding the out-of-state purchase 
of big-ticket items. The significance of these cases (reminiscent of the old law 
school adage that bad facts make bad law) is in part that the comptroller seeks not 
only to raise the bar on statutory exemptions and exclusions regarding aircraft but 
also to use these cases as a tool to raise the bar in other areas, too. (Indeed, Texas 
has previously focused rapt attention on jewelry and art purchases; if Texas had 
more coastline, one might expect to see dozens of yacht cases winding their way 
through the courts.) 
B.  LEGISLATION 
Former Governor Rick Perry spent much of his considerably long tenure as 
Texas governor advancing his particular brand of “econovangelism” to businesses, 
focusing in large part on economic incentives to attract businesses to the state and 
a consistent―and comparatively low―overall tax burden to retain them once 
they are here. The 2013 legislative session saw the passage of a few significant 
economic development programs that Governor Perry may well add to a growing 
list of what he may consider signature achievements, including programs clearly 
designed to embrace the continuing shift in Texas away from an oil and gas 
economy toward a new technology economy. For a longtime governor with 
obvious national aspirations, increasing the perception of Texas as a business-
friendly and forward-looking state with a reasonable and certain tax regime may 
add important conservative bona fides that Governor Perry surely hopes will go a 
long way toward increasing his influence in the upcoming GOP presidential 
primary battle. 
House Bill 1223 created an exemption, codified in section 151.359 of the Tax 
Code, from state (but not local) sales tax for certain tangible personal property 
purchases made in connection with either building or refurbishing data centers 
in Texas.30 In order to qualify for the exemption, a data center must be at least 
100,000 square feet of space in a single building or portion of a single 
 
 29. Energy Educ. of Mont., 2013 WL 1831453, at *4. 
 30. Tex. H.B. 1223, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.359 (West 2013). 
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building―meaning that this exemption is functionally reserved for big players.31 
The data center must be specifically built or refurbished primarily to house servers 
and related equipment for processing, storing, and distributing data.32 One 
requirement that has caused some confusion―and prompted the comptroller to 
issue emergency clarifying interpretations―provides that the data center must be 
used by a single qualifying occupant and that the occupant (or the owner or 
operator of the data center, if the occupant is a lessee) must create at least twenty 
full-time, permanent jobs that meet certain pay criteria.33 Qualification for the 
exemption also requires a commitment to invest at least $200 million in the data 
center over a five-year period following the data center’s qualification for the 
incentive.34 
House Bill 800, which touches on both sales tax and franchise tax, modified 
the Tax Code to give taxpayers the option to select either a sales tax exemption or 
a franchise tax credit with respect to certain research and development costs.35 
Under the sales tax option, taxpayers may claim an exemption with respect to the 
sale, storage, or use of depreciable tangible personal property used in activities 
that meet the Internal Revenue Code’s definition of “qualified research” 
(including, for instance, certain experimentation undertaken to make 
technological discoveries).36 Under the franchise tax option, taxable entities may 
generally claim a credit against franchise tax liability in the amount of five percent 
of the difference between qualified research expenses (defined by reference to the 
same Internal Revenue Code provision cited under the sales tax option) in the 
report year and fifty percent of the average qualified research expenses incurred 
in the three tax periods preceding the report year.37 Importantly, both the sales 
tax provisions and the franchise tax provisions make clear that a business claiming 
an incentive under one Tax Code chapter is ineligible to receive the incentive 
under the other chapter.38 
Amendments to section 151.3186 of the Tax Code by House Bill 1133 entitle 
providers of cable television, Internet access, or telecommunications services to a 
refund of sales tax paid on certain tangible personal property directly used by the 
providers or their subsidiaries in providing their services.39 The bill specifically 
excludes from the refund property used in providing data processing or 
information services, indicating that the legislature may have been sensitive to the 
notion of giving businesses in the data center space double benefits.40 On the 
other hand, providers of such services qualify for the resale exemption with respect 
 
 31. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.359(a)(2) (West 2013). 
 32. Id. § 151.359(a)(2)(B). 
 33. See id. §§ 151.359(a)(2)(C), (d)(2)(A); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.335 (2013) (Tex. 
Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Property Used in a Qualifying Data Center; Temporary State Sales Tax 
Exemption). 
 34. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.359(d)(2)(B) (West 2013). 
 35. Tex. H.B. 800, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013). 
 36. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3182 (West 2013). 
 37. Id. § 171.654. 
 38. Id. §§ 151.3182(b)(2), 171.653. 
 39. Tex. H.B. 1133, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3186(b) (West 
2013). 
 40. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3186(c) (West 2013). 
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to certain of their purchases of services and tangible personal property.41 
Interestingly, an early draft of this House Bill 1133 provision appeared to 
contemplate an unlimited sales tax refund for qualifying providers.42 However, 
apparently because the associated fiscal note would have been far too 
expensive―both monetarily and politically―the refund as enacted is capped at 
an aggregate fifty million dollars, to be pro rated among eligible providers if total 
claimed refunds exceed that maximum amount.43 
C.  COMPTROLLER RULES 
The comptroller amended Rule 3.313, which concerns cable television 
services.44 The amendment addresses changes in the kinds of services cable 
television providers offer and in how they offer those services45 including through 
bundled transactions. Bundling of services―both taxable and nontaxable― is an 
old phenomenon, but the increasing frequency of marketing bundles that may 
include, for example, cable, Internet, telephone, and home security services 
renewed attention to this issue, including to local tax sourcing rules for services 
that can be accessed from multiple locations, such as services offered through 
mobile devices.46 
The comptroller also amended Rule 3.365, which concerns the sales tax holiday 
for clothing, shoes, and school supplies, to adjust the dates that the sale is offered 
in 2015 to August 7th through August 9th.47 
II.  FRANCHISE TAX 
A.  REPORTED CASES 
Following the handful of recent, significant cases challenging the franchise tax 
on constitutional grounds, this Survey period seemed relatively quiet in terms of 
reported appellate decisions. However, district courts continue to see a number 
of cases about the franchise tax―which in many ways is still largely uninterpreted 
following its 2006 overhaul. 
In Combs v. Newpark Resources, Inc., Newpark sought a refund of franchise taxes 
it paid under protest after the comptroller denied its cost-of-goods-sold 
deduction.48 Newpark’s business involves the manufacture of, sale of, and services 
 
 41. See id. § 151.006 (defining “sale for resale”). 
 42. See Tex. H.B. 1133, 83rd Leg., R.S. (as introduced, Feb. 8, 2013). 
 43. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3186(d) (West 2013). 
 44. Tex. Reg. 770 (2014) (codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.313 (Tex. 
Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Cable Television Service and Bundle Cable Service)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. For a rule relating to bundled services that has been on the books for a while, see 34 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.330(d)(2) (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Data Processing Services) (addressing 
the bundling of taxable and nontaxable data processing services and providing that the entire charge 
for certain bundled services is presumed taxable unless the taxable services are de minimis. 
Importantly, the rule also provides guidance on how to rebut the presumption). 
 47. Tex. Reg. 7624 (2013), adopted 39 Tex. Reg 1479 (2014) (codified as an amendment to 34 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.365 (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Sales Tax Holiday—Clothing, Shoes 
and School Supplies)); see also Tex. S.B. 485, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013). 
 48. Combs v. Newpark Res., Inc., 422 S.W.3d 46, 48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet. h.). 
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related to drilling mud, which is used to cool and lubricate a drill as it removes 
rock and dirt from a well hole.49 NES, one of Newpark’s subsidiaries, removes 
from the drill site and disposes of the rock and dirt extracted from the well hole.50 
Newpark’s customers generally contract with Newpark for its services as an 
“integrated service package” rather than purchasing individual services from each 
of Newpark’s subsidiaries.51 
The comptroller argued that section 171.1014(e)(1) of the Tax Code requires 
that each member of a combined group be considered separately to determine its 
eligibility for the cost-of-goods-sold deduction, and therefore because NES itself 
does not sell any goods, it cannot qualify for the cost-of-goods-sold deduction.52 
The court, recognizing that section 171.1014(e) is an accounting mechanism used 
to determine the amount of each member’s cost of goods sold, concluded that 
section 171.1014(e) should not be construed “as an additional substantive 
limitation that would require each member’s business activity to be viewed in 
complete isolation from the combined group.”53 Contrary to the comptroller’s 
assertion, the court, relying on section 171.1014(d-1) and the overall structure of 
section 171.1014, concluded that eligibility for the cost-of-goods-sold deduction 
must be determined in the context of the combined group’s overall business.54 
This case is striking in part because, since the adoption of the revised franchise 
tax in 2006, taxpayers have pointed out that requiring a single deduction election 
with respect to an entire combined group could effectively cause certain entities 
in a group to lose most of the benefit of their entity-level deductions. The court’s 
acknowledgment in this case that the comptroller must evaluate a business’s 
eligibility to contribute to its combined group’s cost-of-goods-sold deduction by 
reviewing the business’s activities in context rather than in isolation is a reassuring 
limitation on the comptroller’s interpretation of the statutory requirement that 
all entities in a combined group share a single deduction election. 
The court next addressed whether NES’s disposal services qualified for the cost-
of-goods-sold deduction.55 Although the cost-of-goods-sold deduction generally 
applies to the sale of real or tangible property, section 171.1012(i) specifically 
provides that a “taxable entity furnishing labor or materials to a project for the 
construction, improvement, remodeling, repair or industrial maintenance . . . of 
real property is considered the owner of that labor or materials and may include 
the costs . . . in the computation of costs of goods sold.”56 Because it was 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. This common business practice of bundling items for sale often triggers tax controversies. 
See discussion supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 52. Newark Res., 422 S.W.3d, at 51; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(e) (West 2013) (stating 
that “a combined group that elects to subtract costs of goods sold shall determine that amount by 
determining the cost of goods sold for each of its members . . . as if the member were an individual 
taxable entity . . .”). 
 53. Newpark Res., 422 S.W.3d at 52. 
 54. Id. The court’s conclusion gives appropriate attention to section 171.1014(d-1). See TEX. 
TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(d-1) (West 2013) (stating that a “member of a combined group may 
claim as cost of goods sold [certain] costs . . . if the goods for which the costs are incurred are owned 
by another member of the combined group” (emphasis added)). 
 55. Newpark Res., 422 S.W.3d at 53–57. 
 56. Compare TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(a)(1) (West 2013) (defining “goods” to mean 
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undisputed at trial that Newpark’s well drilling was a project for the construction 
and improvement of real property, the court turned to the issue of whether NES’s 
activities constituted labor sufficiently related to the construction and 
improvement of real property.57 Although noting that certain labor could be too 
far removed from the construction and improvement of real property to qualify 
for the deduction, the court found that the disposal services at issue were essential 
to the drilling operation and therefore qualified for the deduction.58 
In American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Combs, the district court addressed whether 
AMC’s costs for acquiring the rights to show movies may be included in its cost 
of goods sold.59 The court―perhaps unsurprisingly―agreed with AMC’s 
position that the language of section 171.1012 of the Tax Code plainly applies to 
AMC’s activities.60 In determining the cost of goods sold that may be subtracted 
to compute a taxpayer’s taxable margin, “goods” are defined as “real or tangible 
personal property sold in the ordinary course of business,” and “tangible personal 
property” includes “personal property that can be seen . . . or that is perceptible 
to the senses” and “films” that are “reasonably likely . . . [to] be mass-distributed.”61 
The court did, however, reject AMC’s alternative argument, which relied on a 
recent amendment to section 171.1012 that even more clearly applied to AMC’s 
activities, on the grounds that the amendment was not in effect for the years at 
issue in this case.62 The amendment, described by the legislature as a clarification 
of law, is codified in section 171.1012(t); this subsection explicitly provides that, 
for a movie theater, the cost of goods sold “shall be the costs . . . in relation to the 
acquisition, production, exhibition, or use of the film . . . including expenses for 
the right to use the film.”63 
In Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Combs, a case on appeal at the time this article went to 
press, Rent-A-Center argued that it was entitled to the special half-percent tax rate 
that applies to taxpayers “primarily engaged in retail or wholesale trade.”64 Section 
171.0001 of the Tax Code defines retail trade and wholesale trade with reference 
to the “1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual published by the federal 
Office of Management and Budget.”65 Rent-A-Center argued that its activities fell 
within multiple categories of retail trade as described in the SIC Manual and that 
 
“real or tangible personal property”), with id. § 171.1012(i). The court also determined that section 
171.1012(e) permits “the party that supplies labor or materials to the construction, improvement, 
remodeling, repair, or industrial maintenance of real property [to] deduct its labor or material 
expenses as a cost of goods sold, assuming those expenses would qualify as the cost of selling real property.” 
Newpark Res., 422 S.W.3d at 53 (emphasis added). 
 57. Newpark Res., 422 S.W.3d at 56–57. 
 58. Id. at 57. 
 59. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-12-003831 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, 
Tex. Sept. 18, 2013). 
 60. Id. 
 61. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.1012(a)(1), (3) (West 2013); see also Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, Am. 
Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-12-003831, at *3–10 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, 
Tex. Sept. 17, 2013). 
 62. Am. Multi-Cinema, No. D-1-GN-12-003831, at *1 (200th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sept. 
18, 2013). 
 63. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1012(t) (West 2013). 
 64. Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-001059 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. 
Dec. 11, 2012). 
 65. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.0001(12), (18) (West 2013). 
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its rent-to-own contracts were essentially installment contracts.66 The court, 
however, ruled in favor of the comptroller, who had argued that the majority of 
Rent-A-Center’s revenue came from rentals and fees and not from sales.67 The 
legislature has already weighed in on this issue by enacting House Bill 500, which 
added to the definition of “retail trade” in the franchise tax “activities involving 
the rental or leasing of . . . furniture that are classified as Industry 7359 of the 
1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual,” which covers “Equipment 
Rental and Leasing, Not Elsewhere Classified.”68 
In another case on appeal at the time this article went to press, Gulf Chemical 
& Metallurgical Corp. v. Combs, the district court denied Gulf Chemical’s claim for 
refund under Texas’s former franchise tax.69 Gulf argued that, for apportioning 
its franchise tax liabilities among the states in which it operated, it should be 
allowed to offset its gross receipts with credits that it provided to customers for 
precious metals that Gulf acquired as a by-product of the services it provided.70 
The court, however, ruled in favor of the comptroller, who had argued that the 
plain language of the then-applicable statute and administrative rule required Gulf 
to use the same accounting method in its state return as it had used in its federal 
return.71 
In Winstead PC v. Combs, the district court agreed with the taxpayer and 
properly invalidated Rule 3.589(e)(2)(D) to the extent that it prohibits a taxpayer 
from deducting as compensation the cost of any benefits that are deductible for 
federal income tax purposes.72 Section 171.1013(b)(2) of the Tax Code provides 
that “the cost all benefits, to the extent deductible for federal income tax purposes 
. . . provide[d] to [a taxpayer’s] officers, directors, owners, partners, and employees” 
may be subtracted as compensation in determining a taxpayer’s taxable margin.73 
 
 66. Plaintiff Rent-A-Center, Inc.’s Trial Brief, Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-
001059, at *8–11 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Jan. 17, 2013). This case is one of many 
pending challenges to the comptroller’s interpretation of the retail-or-wholesale category. The 
comptroller’s overly narrow interpretation in some cases appears to be not only revenue-motivated 
but also triggered by a dazzling array of companies claiming to be wholesalers and retailers. 
 67. Rent-A-Center, No D-1-GN-11-001059; Defendant’s Trial Brief, Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. 
Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-001059 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Jan. 17, 2013), at *5. 
 68. See discussion infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 69. Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-003174 (261st Dist. Ct., 
Travis County, Tex. Oct. 16, 2012). A potentially significant case dealing with the apportionment 
rules under Texas’s current franchise tax regime that was also on appeal at the time this article went 
to press is Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Hegar, 03-14-00197-CV (Tex. App.—Austin filed Apr. 2, 2014). 
At the trial court level, Graphic Packaging relied in part on the California case Gillette Co. v. Franchise 
Tax Bd., 144 Cal. Rptr. 555 (2012), vacated, Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603 
(2013), to argue that it should be allowed to use the Multistate Tax Compact’s three-factor 
apportionment method. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Graphic Packaging Corp. v. Combs, No. D-1-
GN-12-003038, at *7–9 (353rd Dist. Ct, Travis County, Tex. Sept. 27, 2012). The trial court, 
however, ruled against Graphic Packaging. Graphic Packaging, No. D-1-GN-12-003038, at *1 (353rd 
Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Mar. 18, 2014). 
 70. Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-003174, 
at *1–2 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Oct. 11, 2012). 
 71. Gulf Chem., No. D-1-GN-11-003174, at *1; Defendant’s Trial Brief, Gulf Chem. & 
Metallurgical Corp. v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-11-003174, at *5 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. 
Oct. 11, 2012). 
 72. Winstead PC v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-12-000141 (201st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Mar. 
18, 2013). 
 73. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1013(b)(2) (West 2013). 
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Relying on Rule 3.589(e)(2)(D), which excludes from the term “benefits” “working 
condition amounts provided so employees can perform their jobs,” the 
comptroller had assessed a deficiency for amounts that Winstead had subtracted 
in calculating its taxable margin for parking expenses, attorney occupation taxes, 
and continuing education expenses, all of which, Winstead pointed out, were 
properly deductible for federal income tax purposes.74 
B.  LEGISLATION 
Though the franchise tax has been the target of much vitriol―from both 
taxpayers and elected officials―since the 2006 overhaul that gave rise to its 
current margin-based formulation, the legislature has been reluctant to adopt 
sweeping changes. Indeed, every legislative session since 2006 has opened amid 
rumors that the tax would be significantly overhauled or scrapped entirely in favor 
of something new and better. The 2013 legislative session, however, unlike most 
of the earlier sessions, enacted some truly significant changes to the tax. 
House Bill 500 amended the franchise tax in a number of respects, including 
by temporarily reducing the tax rate from one percent (one-half percent for certain 
retailers and wholesalers) to 0.975% (0.4875% for certain retailers and 
wholesalers) in 2014 and, subject to the comptroller’s certification that sufficient 
revenue will be available, to 0.95% (0.475% for certain wholesalers and retailers) 
in 2015.75 As small business advocates have long pointed out, businesses earning 
merely one dollar more than the previous small business threshold (under which 
no tax was due) lost the entire benefit of the tax relief intended for small 
businesses; to eliminate that cliff rule, the legislature enacted what effectively 
constitutes a guaranteed minimum one-million-dollar deduction from total 
revenue in determining an entity’s taxable margin.76 Importantly, the 2013 
legislature left intact a taxable entity’s option to elect to deduct cost of goods sold 
or compensation, so taxable entities generally are still entitled to elect (subject to 
Tax Code restrictions) whichever deduction―thirty percent of total revenue, cost 
of goods sold, compensation, or the new one-million-dollar deduction―is most 
favorable.77 
House Bill 500 also amended the retail and wholesale trade provisions.78 These 
provisions had been the subject of extensive discussion and negotiation in 2006, 
when the legislature first enacted the margin tax, and many taxpayers had argued 
the result was unfair. The bill added to the definition of “retail trade” activities 
qualifying taxable entities for the favorable half-percent rate, including certain 
auto repair services and rental activities that the comptroller had argued were not 
 
 74. Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Winstead PC v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-12-000141, at *4 (201st 
Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Mar. 18, 2013). 
 75. Tex. H.B. 500, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013); see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.0022, 171.0023 
(West 2013). 
 76. See Tex. H.B. 500, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.0022, 171.0023, 
171.101(a)(1) (West 2013). Technically, the Tax Code doesn’t include a thirty percent deduction; 
instead, it provides that one of the options for determining a taxable entity’s margin is by reference 
to seventy percent of the taxable entity’s total revenue from its entire business. 
 77. See id.; see also Ohlenforst, supra note 2, at 1196–97 (discussing the comptroller’s policy 
changes allowing taxpayers to change their deduction election). 
 78. Tex. H.B. 500, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013). 
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previously expressly covered by the provision.79 Further, the legislature created 
essentially a de minimis standard for combined groups that would qualify for the 
favorable half-percent rate if they were not required to include an entity that 
provides retail or wholesale electric utilities.80 The revised law makes clear that 
retailers and wholesalers can keep their favorable half-percent franchise tax rate, 
provided that less than five percent of the combined group’s total revenue is 
attributable to the types of prohibited electric utility activities described in the 
section.81 
The legislature also made a handful of other, more modest changes to the 
franchise tax, including adoption of specific provisions for apportioning receipts 
from Internet hosting: Only receipts from Internet hosting customers located in 
Texas will be treated as Texas receipts.82 This sourcing rule reflects the recognition 
that Texas must recognize that Internet hosting and other high-tech businesses 
can and will leave the state if it is overly aggressive in trying to source such activities 
to Texas. House Bill 500 also provided exclusions from total revenue for certain 
industries: Pharmacy networks may exclude from total revenue certain 
reimbursements for payments to pharmacies in the pharmacy network;83 
transporters of aggregates and barite exclude from total revenue certain 
subcontracting payments for delivery or transportation services;84 and the long-
cited but arguably under-defined “landman services” was defined to include 
performing title searches and undertaking certain negotiations, and taxable 
entities engaged in providing landman services now have explicit confirmation 
that they are permitted to exclude from total revenue subcontracting payments 
made for such services.85 Also, in keeping with the heavy incentives push from the 
session, certain businesses relocating their main offices to Texas―generally for 
the first time―may deduct from their apportioned margin certain costs of the 
relocation.86 
III.  PROPERTY TAX 
A.  REPORTED CASES 
Although taxpayers during this Survey period struggled with some of the 
perennial procedural foot-faults that derailed taxpayers in cases described in 
earlier Survey articles (see infra Part IV), this Survey period offered a handful of 
 
 79. See TEX. TAX CODE § 171.0001(12); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. In some 
early margin tax audits, the comptroller’s auditors disallowed the half-percent rate if the Standard 
Industrial Classification or North American Industry Classification System code listed on a 
company’s federal income tax return related to anything other than traditional retailer or wholesaler 
activities. Fortunately, the comptroller abandoned that formulaic approach; however, she continued 
to challenge frequently the lower rate when entities provided services in addition to selling tangible 
personal property. 
 80. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(j) (West 2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 171.106(g). 
 83. Id. § 171.1011(g-4). 
 84. Id. § 171.1011(g-10). 
 85. Id. § 171.1011(g-11). 
 86. Id. § 171.109. 
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other interesting property tax cases, including appeals from appraisal review board 
determinations brought by the appraisal districts rather than by the taxpayers. 
Exemption issues continue to be a hot topic as the Texas real estate market, and 
consequently property values, makes further leaps out of the depths of the past 
few years of economic uncertainty. This Survey period also saw the return of many 
taxpayers’ favorite appeal method, sometimes reserved for when all else has failed: 
the section 25.25 challenge to correct appraisal rolls. 
In Texas Student Housing Authority v. Brazos County Appraisal District, the 
Amarillo Court of Appeals addressed the exempt status of a college dormitory 
used for various activities during summer months.87 At issue was a dormitory used 
during the academic year to house Texas A&M University and Blinn College 
students that was also used during the summer months as housing for various 
athletic camps, a 4-H competition, a medical program, and a cheer camp.88 
The student housing authority asserted that the dormitory was exempt from ad 
valorem taxes under, among other provisions, section 53.46 of the Education 
Code, which exempts property “held for educational purposes only” and “devoted 
exclusively to the use and benefit of students, faculty, and staff members of an 
accredited institution of higher education.”89 After determining that Texas A&M 
is an institution of higher education, the court analyzed which of the participants 
in the various summer programs were students of the university and looked at the 
relationships between the university and the organizations conducting the 
summer programs.90 The court acknowledged that the term “student” 
encompasses “more than the traditional, full-time student enrolled in regular 
classes,” but limited the term to participants in programs conducted by 
organizations having a relationship with Texas A&M that was “forged or 
supported by legislative mandate.”91 Under this analysis, the 4-H competition and 
medical program, which had such legislatively mandated relationships with Texas 
A&M, qualified under section 53.46. However, the cheer camp and a hockey 
camp, which were conducted by an unrelated out-of-state, for-profit corporation 
and an unrelated charitable organization, did not meet the section 53.46 
requirements.92 The court therefore held that the property qualified for the 
exemption only in the year when neither the cheer camp nor hockey camp was 
held.93 Because this analysis resolved the exemption issue for all years at issue, the 
court declined to address whether participants of the other athletic camps, which 
were officially sanctioned by Texas A&M, are “students” under section 53.46.94 
The court also dismissed the student housing authority’s alternative arguments 
that the dormitory qualified for an exemption under article XI, section 9 of the 
Texas Constitution and section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code, both of which require 
 
 87. Tex. Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 440 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2013, pet. filed). 
 88. Id. at 781–85. 
 89. Id. at 787; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.46 (West 2013). 
 90. Tex. Student Hous. Auth., 440 S.W.3d at 788–89. (Surely even Tea-Sips would concede that 
Texas A&M is an institution of higher education.) 
 91. Id. at 787–88. 
 92. Id. at 788–89. 
 93. Id. at 796–97. 
 94. Id. at 789. 
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that the property be used for a public purpose, under a similar analysis as for 
section 53.46, finding that activities conducted by organizations unaffiliated with 
Texas A&M did not serve a public purpose.95 
Another case, Brazos County Appraisal District v. Bryan-College Station Regional 
Association of Realtors, Inc., involved an exemption that relates to property of 
nonprofit community business organizations pursuant to section 11.231 of the 
Tax Code.96 To qualify for an exemption under section 11.231, an organization 
must be a “nonprofit community business organization” that primarily performs 
one of the following functions: “(1) promoting the common economic interests 
of commercial enterprises; (2) improving the business conditions of one or more 
types of business; or (3) otherwise providing services to aid in economic 
development.”97 
The appraisal district argued that a nonprofit community business organization 
as defined in section 11.231 is not an “institution . . . engaged primarily in public 
charitable functions,” as used in article VIII, section 2 of the Texas Constitution.98 
In so arguing, the appraisal district urged the court to follow the line of cases that 
had interpreted the former language of article VIII, section 2 that allowed an 
exemption for “purely public” charities.99 Finding that the amendment to the 
cited constitutional provision was meant to broaden the category of activities 
eligible for exemption, the court rejected the appraisal district’s argument and 
relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of “charitable purposes” in 
Boyd v. Frost National Bank to determine that the association qualified for the 
exemption.100 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Boyd found that 
“charitable purposes” include “the relief of poverty, the advancement of 
education, the advancement of religion, the promotion of health, governmental 
or municipal purposes, and other purposes the accomplishment of which is 
beneficial to the community.”101 The court in Bryan-College further commented 
that the exemption set forth in article VIII, section 2 is likely broader than the 
analysis of the language in the trust that the court in Boyd analyzed: “[T]he phrase 
‘public charitable function’ [in the Texas Constitution] includes, at a minimum, 
everything that the Supreme Court has considered in Boyd to be a ‘charitable 
purpose.’”102 
Appraisal districts got in on the action during the Survey period, including in 
Harris County Appraisal District v. Houston 8th Wonder Property, L.P., in which the 
Houston Court of Appeals considered an appeal by an appraisal district.103 In 
 
 95. Id. at 790–96. 
 96. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Bryan-College Station Reg’l Assoc. of Realtors, Inc., 419 
S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. denied). 
 97. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.231(b), (d) (West 2013). 
 98. Bryan-College Station Reg’l Assoc. of Realtors, 419 S.W.3d at 464; see also Tex. Const. art. VIII, 
§ 2. In 1999, the Texas Constitution was amended to replace the phrase “purely public charity” with 
the phrase at issue in this case, “engaged primarily in public charitable functions.” Bryan-College Station 
Reg’l Assoc. of Realtors, 419 S.W.3d at 464. 
 99. Bryan-College Station Reg’l Assoc. of Realtors, 419 S.W.3d at 465. 
 100. Id. at 464–65; see also Boyd v. Frost Nat’l Bank, 196 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1946). In Boyd, the 
court interpreted “charitable purposes” in the context of a trust created in a will. Id. 
 101. Boyd, 196 S.W.2d at 502. 
 102. Bryan-College Station Reg’l Assoc. of Realtors, 419 S.W.3d at 465. 
 103. Harris Cnty. Apraisal Dist. v. Houston 8th Wonder Prop., L.P., 395 S.W.3d 245, 248–49 
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seeking a reduction to the value of the former site of Six Flags Astroworld, 8th 
Wonder had asserted at the ARB hearing that gave rise to this court case that (i) 
the value of the property was over market value and (ii) the value was unequal as 
compared with other properties.104 At trial, 8th Wonder argued that it had 
presented evidence on, and the ARB’s order addressed, only the latter of these 
two grounds, and therefore the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
appraisal district’s appeal of the former ground, market value.105 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the appraisal district’s 
appeal, concluding that the requirements of sections 42.02 and 42.06 are the only 
requirements that the appraisal district must fulfill in order to appeal an ARB 
order and that those requirements were fulfilled.106 In addition, the court noted 
that 8th Wonder had included market value in its protest and that the ARB order 
stated that it reduced both appraised and market values of the property at issue.107 
According to the court’s decision, only property owners are required to exhaust 
administrative remedies before having the right to appeal: “Unlike the property 
owner, the appraisal district had no prior administrative remedy to exhaust at the 
ARB stage of the proceeding. As the entity responsible for the initial property 
valuation, the appraisal district had no right to initiate the protest procedure and 
no control over what objections would be presented . . . .”108 The procedures 
applicable to the appraisal district “began with its right of ‘appeal’ to the district 
court for a trial de novo.”109 Finally, citing sections 42.26(a)(1) and (2) of the Tax 
Code, which address the circumstances when market value is used to determine 
appraisal ratios pursuant to a claim of unequal appraisal, the court of appeals 
determined, contrary to 8th Wonder’s assertion, that market value was indeed 
relevant to the issue of unequal appraisal.110 
Because no Survey period would be complete without an addition to the be-
careful-what-you-wish-for file, Houston Cement Co. v. Harris County Appraisal District 
merits discussion.111 This case addressed a taxpayer challenge to the value of its 
inventory after it had entered into written agreements with the appraisal district 
concerning the appraised value of certain property.112 Houston Cement later 
 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). The court of appeals also addressed two issues 
related to expert testimony that are not discussed in this article. 
 104. Id. at 249. 
 105. Id. at 250–52. 
 106. Id. at 248. “A chief appraiser who wishes to appeal such an order of the ARB must (1) obtain 
written approval of the board of directors of the appraisal district, (2) file a written notice of appeal 
within 15 days of receipt of the notice from the ARB determining the taxpayer protest, and (3) deliver 
a copy of the notice of appeal to the property owner whose property is involved in the appeal.” Id. at 
249–50; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.02, 42.06 (West 2013). The court of appeals subsequently 
determined that the dismissal of the appraisal district’s appeal was harmless because the appraisal 
district was permitted to present its arguments and evidence related to market value without 
substantive limitation, and the trial court determined the value of the property in de novo 
proceedings. Houston 8th Wonder, 395 S.W.3d at 252–53. 
 107. Houston 8th Wonder, 395 S.W.3d at 250. 
 108. Id. at 251. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 251–52; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.26(a)(1), (2) (West 2013). 
 111. Houston Cement Co. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-12-00491-CV, 2013 WL 
3243281, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2013, no pet.). 
 112. Id. at *1–2. An agreement between a property owner and the chief appraiser is final “if the 
agreement related to a matter which may be protested to the appraisal review board or on which a 
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argued that these (wished-for) agreements did not apply to certain inventory that 
was in transit and not yet located in Harris County on January 1 of the relevant 
tax years.113 However, the court found that Houston Cement’s argument was 
contrary to the plain language of the agreements, which covered several types of 
property, including inventory, and dismissed Houston Cement’s claim under 
section 25.25(c) of the Tax Code for lack of jurisdiction.114 
Another section 25.25 case, Bauer-Pileco, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District, 
also addressed a taxpayer request to correct the appraisal rolls.115 Much like the 
taxpayer in Houston Cement, Bauer discovered, after filing its personal property 
renditions and paying taxes based on those renditions, that it had erroneously 
included in the renditions “inventory in transit” and “work in process” 
subaccounts as well as inventory accounts of a California company with which 
Bauer had recently merged.116 Bauer argued that section 25.25(c)(3), which 
provides for a correction to the appraisal rolls for “property that does not exist in 
the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll,” entitled it to summary 
judgment.117 
Bauer had property located in Texas other than the property at issue.118 The 
appraisal district argued that because Bauer had some personal property located in 
Texas, section 25.25(c)(3) did not apply; according to the appraisal district, 
Bauer’s claim did not involve the form or location of the personal property (as 
required by section 25.25(c)(3)), but rather the value of the personal property.119 
In what looked like a victory for the taxpayer, the Houston Court of Appeals 
initially ruled in favor of Bauer, but upon rehearing, the court changed its mind 
and ruled in favor of the appraisal district. Following the Dallas Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Titanium Metals Corp v. Dallas County Appraisal District, the Houston 
Court of Appeals concluded that the reference to the property’s “form” in section 
25.25(c)(3) permits courts to change only the description of the property’s form 
in the appraisal roll and not, as Bauer had argued, to look behind the appraisal 
roll to the types of property included in a taxpayer’s rendition.120 The court 
reasoned that the complained-of errors affected the value of the property in the 
district, and could have been corrected pursuant to section 25.25(d).121 However, 
 
protest has been filed but not determined by the board; or which may be corrected under section 
25.25 or on which a motion for correction under that section has been filed but not determined by 
the board.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.111(e) (West 2013). 
 113. Houston Cement, 2013 WL 3243281, at *2. 
 114. Id. at *2–3; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c) (West 2013). 
 115. Bauer-Pileco, Inc. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 443 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. filed). 
 116. Id. at 306–07. 
 117. Id. at 308; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(c)(3) (West 2013). 
 118. Bauer, 433 S.W.3d at 312. 
 119. Id. at *6–7. The appraisal district relied on a Dallas Court of Appeals case that interpreted 
section 25.25(c)(3) to apply “only when no property exists in the form or at the location described in 
the appraisal roll.” See Titanium Metals Corp. v. Dallas Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 3 S.W.3d 63, 66 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.). 
 120. Bauer, 443 S.W.3d at 312; Titanium Metals, 3 S.W.3d at 67. 
 121. Bauer, 443 S.W.3d at 310; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(d) (West 2013) (providing that a 
motion may be filed “[a]t any time prior to the date the taxes become delinquent . . . to change the 
appraisal roll to correct an error that resulted in an incorrect appraised value . . .”). Bauer did not 
timely file a motion under section 25.25(d). Bauer, 443 S.W.3d at 313. 
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the court stated that “broadly construing section 25.25(c)(3) to allow the type of 
complaint at issue here would be contrary to the legislative scheme of providing a 
taxing entity the ability to establish a final tax roll.”122 The court pointed out that 
the Tax Code permits a taxpayer to protest the inclusion of types of property in 
the appraisal roll in a timely filed administrative protest and that Bauer had 
missed the deadline to file a protest by several years.”123 
B.  LEGISLATION 
In the 2013 session, the legislature continued to tweak Texas property tax 
provisions, this time by focusing particular attention on qualifications and 
procedural standards for appraisal review boards.124 Changes to these standards 
seemed to prompt as much discussion as the handful of substantive changes 
affecting the taxability of certain property. Following a long line of legislative 
amendments affecting the taxpayer experience at (and complaints about) the 
appraisal review board level, the legislature enacted new training requirements for 
chief appraisers,125 authorized the comptroller to appoint eligible chief appraisers 
to replace ineligible chief appraisers,126 required the comptroller to issue a model 
ARB hearing procedure manual,127 and prohibited a former appraiser or taxpayer 
representative (including, presumably, contingency-fee consultants) from serving 
on appraisal review boards.128 
The protest and appeal procedures at and after the ARB phase were also a target 
of the legislature’s attention. House Bill 585 includes a new standard procedure 
for claiming an allocation for certain boats and aircraft used in interstate 
commerce and requires taxpayers owning those items to claim allocations 
annually, by May 1, on a form prescribed by the comptroller.129 The legislature 
also created a new presumption that taxpayer claims for property tax refunds are 
denied after ninety days if the tax collector does not respond to the application.130 
Upon either an express or a deemed denial, taxpayers are entitled to bring suit in 
district court to compel payment of the claimed refund, and prevailing taxpayers 
may be awarded attorneys’ fees and court costs.131 Along the same lines, the 
legislature provided that taxpayers prevailing in appeals from the denial of certain 
property tax exemptions―including certain civic associations and nonprofit 
economic development organizations―may also recover attorneys’ fees.132 
Thanks to House Bill 316, taxpayers aggrieved by ARB determinations may 
now proceed to the State Office of Administrative Hearings (SOAH) to appeal 
those orders no matter where they live. The legislature made the SOAH option 
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 126. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.0501(a) (West 2013). 
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 130. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 31.11(j) (West 2013). 
 131. See id. § 31.11(k). 
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permanent and available across all counties (it had previously been available as a 
pilot program only in certain counties).133 
House Bill 585 also addressed long-standing taxpayer complaints about 
appraisal districts’ apparent efforts to circumvent court orders or agreements 
lowering property values by hiking up appraisals in the year following a resolved 
valuation dispute.134 The amendment to section 33.49 of the Tax Code requires 
appraisal districts to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a higher value 
is justified with respect to property whose value was lowered in the preceding 
year.135 
In keeping with the legislature’s economic development theme for this session, 
several property tax incentives made their way to the governor’s desk and into law. 
House Joint Resolution 133 and House Bill 3121 authorize an extension of the 
freeport exemption for goods detained in Texas for a short period of time from 
175 days to a much longer 730 days for certain aircraft parts.136 Voters approved 
the measure, which required constitutional approval, in a November 2013 
election. House Bill 1897 provides a temporary exemption for landfill gas capture 
property and allows for taxpayers and appraisal districts to enter into agreements 
as to the exempt status of the pollution control equipment, subject to final ruling 
on the claimed exemption by the Texas Commission on Environmental 
Quality.137 House Bill 2500 requires appraisal districts to use the cost method 
(together with certain adjustments and other limitations) to determine the value 
of certain solar equipment.138 
IV.  PROCEDURE 
Procedural pitfalls have tripped up many a taxpayer, including in property tax 
cases.139 To successfully appeal to the district court, a taxpayer must comply with 
multiple formal procedural requirements to ensure that the case is not dismissed 
on jurisdictional or other summary judgment grounds. 
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In Harris County Appraisal District v. ETC Marketing, Ltd., the Houston Court of 
Appeals partially dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal to the district court for failure to 
exhaust its administrative remedies.140 After the appraisal review board 
determined that the appraised value of ETC’s natural gas should not be changed, 
ETC appealed the ARB’s order and added to its appeal the argument that the 
property should be removed from the appraisal rolls because it is in interstate 
commerce, an argument that ETC did not present at the ARB hearing.141 The 
court granted the appraisal district’s partial plea to the jurisdiction, dismissing 
ETC’s interstate-commerce argument, and remanded the case to the district court 
for further proceedings on ETC’s other arguments.142 
Taxpayers in financial distress may take some solace from the Austin Court of 
Appeals’s adherence to its precedent set in Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp.143 In 
Richmont Aviation, Inc. v. Combs, the court reaffirmed that section 112.108 of the 
Tax Code, which seeks to bar judicial review except when the taxpayer has paid 
the taxes, posted a bond, or filed an oath of inability to pay, is unconstitutional 
as “an unreasonable financial barrier to access to the courts” and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.144 The court also rejected the comptroller’s argument 
that In re Nestle USA, Inc.145 overruled Bandag, finding that the Texas Supreme 
Court in Nestle neither expressly mentioned Bandag nor expressly stated that the 
amendments to section 112.108 cured the section’s “constitutional infirmity.”146 
Finally, in Assignees of Best Buy v. Combs, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed 
a trial court’s authority to appoint class counsel to represent individuals with 
respect to sales tax refund claims.147 The refund claims related to rebates received 
by customers of Best Buy and other retailers.148 Pursuant to a court-approved 
settlement agreement, Best Buy and the other retailers assigned their refund rights 
to the customers, i.e., the assignees; the settlement order also appointed counsel 
to present the assignees’ individual claims for refund to the comptroller.149 After 
the comptroller denied the refund claims, the assignees appealed to the district 
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court, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.150 The district court found 
that the assignees had not exhausted their administrative remedies because class 
counsel did not have the authority to file individual refund claims on behalf of 
each assignee.151 
In affirming the trial court’s determination, the court of appeals examined the 
trial court’s power to enter an appointment order under Texas Rule of Civil 
Procedure 42, which provides the guidelines for when a trial court may allow a 
class action and appoint class counsel.152 The court distinguished Best Buy from 
non-tax cases that had permitted counsel to represent a class by pointing out that 
Best Buy involved appointment of counsel for individual claims, not a class 
claim.153 The court was not persuaded that the Rule 42 purposes of efficiency, 
economy, and protection of the interests of absent class members were furthered 
by appointing class counsel, given that the claims were individual claims for 
refund pursued without the knowledge or consent of the absent members.154 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As part of the comptroller’s administration of the state sales and franchise 
taxes, she and her staff have recently initiated several helpful comptroller–industry 
roundtable discussions of key issues. These discussions, a staple in some earlier 
years, offer both the payors and the administrators of the taxes to seek common 
ground in interpreting the law. Property tax administration, though largely a local 
matter in Texas, is clearly subject not only to increased legislative attention to 
procedure but also—like other Texas taxes—to judicial review. Elections (including 
of a new comptroller), legislative changes, and judicial decisions are once again 
changing the Texas landscape in 2015. 
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